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Abstract 
Binary thinking has been entrenched in property law, posing challenges to the protection of 
land tenure and land users who have no title to the land they cultivate. This paper critiques 
the state law centred approach to evaluating the legitimacy of property and defends extralegal 
property, as legitimate claims to land and related natural resources that are not against the 
law, but that are not recognised by the law as formal property rights. It begins with an 
overview of how the legitimacy of property is conceived of at the global level, drawing upon 
several conceptual frameworks of property developed via global initiatives and soft law 
instruments. That being done, it moves to examine the legitimacy of extralegal property from 
the local perspective, looking at a case study of ‘minor rights property’ in China. It is argued 
that long-term usage of land supported by the prevalence of this practice and social consensus 
should be regarded as one of the major sources of the legitimacy of property. The paper 
concludes that the state law centred approach to evaluating the legitimacy of property 
overlooks a range of legitimate property claims and the plurality of norms governing property 
relations. In order to recognise the full spectrum of property, we should link global 
perspectives with local experiences.  
 
Introduction 
Extralegality has an uneasy relationship with property. In his very influential and often-cited 
book The Mystery of Capital, de Soto argues that it is the lack of legal property and the 
predominance of extralegal property that traps people in poverty; extralegal property needs to 
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be converted into legal property via titling, for legality is coupled with title (property 
representation) and it is title that enables people to obtain liquid capital.
 2
 He also argues that 
‘it is legality that is marginal; extralegality has become the norm’.3 In his case study of Peru, 
it is estimated that ‘53 per cent of city dwellers and 81 per cent of people in the countryside 
live in extralegal dwellings’.4 It may be true that extralegality prevails over legality in terms 
of scale, but it is frequently stigmatised as ‘illegal’, ‘underground’ and ‘unregulated’, or is 
often associated with ‘black-market’ economy.5  
De Soto’s analysis of extralegal property and the international drive to individualise land 
rights that his work has propelled do not capture the nature of property and oversimplify the 
source of the legitimacy of property. The concept of property is fluid. For de Soto, property is 
essentially a conversion mechanism whereby assets can be transformed into capital. In such 
an analysis, the scope of property is reduced to things—whether it be ‘assets’ or capital; 
people and social relations are excluded from consideration. Moreover, de Soto 
overemphasises individual absolute dominion manifest in Blackstonian private ownership.
6
 
As a result, a new category of ‘property outsiders’ or ‘legally propertyless masses’, in 
particular those who hold nothing other than occupation or use rights, have been generated，
and have been denied their entitlements to property holding in law.  
This paper re-evaluates the relationship between extralegality and property and critiques the 
state law centred approach to evaluating the legitimacy of property. By property we mean 
property in land and related natural resources, and as explained in Section Two, we use 
property and land tenure interchangeably, as both emphasise the relationship between people 
and land as well as the relationship between people with respect to land. We focus on how 
legitimacy derives from long-term relationships in dealing with land. In developing this 
argument, we draw several crucial distinctions. The first distinction is between ownership and 
property. We will discuss in detail in the following sections that ownership is static, 
formulated by political discourses and ideologies with entrenched boundaries of exclusion; 
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whereas property is dynamic, based on long-term social interactions where a plethora of 
property claims have emerged, many of which are extralegal. We define extralegal property 
as legitimate claims to land and related natural resources that are not against the law, but that 
are not recognised by the law as formal property rights; the origin of extralegal property is 
outside the scope of law.
7  This leads to the second distinction between property claims and 
property rights. While both are part and parcel of diverse property relations, property claims 
are often based on de facto use, long-term social interactions and custom. Indeed the source 
of the legitimacy of property is closely linked to time. By contrast, property rights are 
recognised and enforced by the state.
 8
  The fact that some property claims have not been 
recognised by law does not mean that they are illegitimate.
 9
 This point of view has been 
supported by UN-HABITAT (the United Nations Human Settlements Programme), which 
has stated that ‘a number of parties can hold different tenure claims and rights in the same 
piece of land. These can be either, formal/legal, or informal/extra-legal’.10  
Property is mostly governed by domestic law. Yet, acknowledging the legitimacy of 
extralegal property is challenging if we only focus on property law in the domestic context. 
For example, for scholars in jurisdictions where the rule of law has been well developed, it 
would be difficult for them to comprehend why an ‘illegal’ practice could be legitimate. 
Further, binary thinking is entrenched in the general conceptual framework of property in 
many legal systems. For instance, we are familiar with the idea that ownership can be divided 
into state ownership, commons and private ownership, which leaves limited scope for 
according recognition to other forms of property and property hybrids. Although recent 
studies of the spectrum of state, private, communal, public property and property hybrids 
have begun to break down boundaries within property law and to capture the diversity of 
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property, they have not yet covered a wide range of diverse contexts that include Asian, 
South American and African experiences.
11
  
We need to look at the conceptual framework of property at the global level. Since the second 
half of the twentieth century, the scope of property has dramatically expanded from the local 
to the global.
12
 As a result, a plethora of treaties, customary norms, and soft law instruments 
have emerged to constitute a new body of law — ‘international property law’, as Sprankling 
calls it.
13
 In Section Two, we look at the changes to the traditional conceptual framework of 
property made by some global initiatives, soft law instruments and policy recommendations, 
including the proposals of UN-HABITAT and ‘the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure’ prepared by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the 
United Nations in 2012 (hereinafter, the Voluntary Guidelines 2012).
14
   
After sketching out the conceptual framework of property from the global perspective, our 
research extends to the local experience. We use ‘minor rights property’ in China, the subject 
of competing and even conflicting property claims, as a case study. In many areas in China a 
de facto property market is emerging that consists of affordable properties called ‘minor 
rights properties’; however, this does not constitute a formal legal concept. These sorts of 
properties are built by farmers on collectively owned rural land that is reserved for 
agricultural purposes or for farmers’ residential use according to the classification of land use 
control. Buyers of such properties can obtain an ownership certificate issued by the township 
government. However, the ‘legality’ of such ownership certificates is highly questionable, as 
according to the law, only governments at the county level or above have the authority to 
issue these ownership certificates and register these properties.
15
  When purchasing these 
properties, buyers cannot use mortgages or apply for bank loans to support their purchase. 
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The ‘minor’ nature of such properties is manifested in: the inferior status of the land use 
rights (hereinafter LURs) to the collectively-owned rural land compared to those of urban 
land in terms of transferability on the property market; and by these properties’ ‘illegal’ and 
non-registrable status. Despite this inferior status, a minor rights property market is 
flourishing, due in large part, it seems, to the fact that prices are low and more affordable 
compared to those available on the urban property market. There were already 6 billion 
square meters minor rights properties nationwide by June of 2010.
 16
  In Shenzhen, for 
example, approximately 49.27% of properties were characterised as minor property rights as 
of the end of 2011.
17
 In Section Four, we distinguish different types of minor rights property 
and defend one type which is built on farmers’ residential plots rather than on arable land. 
This sort of property is usually a big house which contains several flats. Farmers retain one 
or two flats for the use of their own family; other flats are available for sale. This particular 
type of minor rights property constitutes a form of extralegal property.  
Our study of minor rights property speaks to analyses of property ‘from the margins’.18 It 
begins by introducing property law in China, which embodies binary thinking of ownership 
and closely links with the urban-rural divide (Section Three). This section also examines the 
emergence of ‘primary rights property’ in order to compare it with minor rights property. It 
then moves on to analyse controversies surrounding minor rights property in China (Section 
Four). That being done, it identifies the origin of extralegality, locating this issue within the 
context of profound socio-economic transformations, in particular urbanisation, which is 
breaking down the urban-rural divide (Section Five). It then criticises the state law centred 
approach to evaluating the legitimacy of property (Section Six). It is concluded that the 
legitimacy of extralegal property does not depend on the sanction of the law. Extralegal 
property mirrors the heterogeneity of property relations, and antedates the formation of 
formal, legal property. The conclusions also point out that there are limits to using national 
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law to protect extralegal property, highlighting instead the possibility of using soft law such 
as global guidelines, which may employ moral force in order to influence states.  
Our method is primarily historical, probing the origin of minor rights property. We review the 
property system and analyse its margins. We have done a substantial survey of Chinese laws 
and regulations pertaining to property from 1949, the founding date of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), and have found that no laws or regulations prohibit the sale of minor rights 
property. We also contrast the primary property market with the minor property market, and 
compare the central government’s approach to minor rights property with the local 
government’s approach and with the social conception of minor rights property. We focus on 
systemic issues, and for this purpose our research is not an empirical study, which would 
usually require the gathering of evidence from localities, although we are aware of local 
particularities and variations given the size and diversity of China. Indeed, to study China, the 
choice is usually between a macro-study of the system or the structure of the whole country 
and a micro-study of a locality (for example, a province, a city or a village, usually through 
fieldwork). The problem with the study of a specific locality is that a conclusion to a study 
that is relevant or useful for one locality (for example, Henan province) is not necessarily 
relevant or useful for another locality (for example, Hunan province). That said, although we 
choose to focus on the ‘big picture’ in this paper, this does not mean we shall overlook the 
importance of field research; we intend this to be the next step in our research, and the subject 
of further papers.  
The Legitimacy of Property: Global Perspectives  
Against the international drive to individualise land rights propelled by de Soto, diverse 
forms of tenure have been recognised by global initiatives, soft law instruments and policy 
recommendations.
19
 In ‘Securing Land Rights for All’, published by UN-HABITAT in 2008, 
different terms have been used, including: 
Land rights: Socially or legally recognized entitlements to access, use and control areas of 
land and related natural resources. 
Property rights: Recognised interests in land or property vested in an individual or group 
and can apply separately to land or development on it. Rights may apply separately to land 
and to property on it (e.g., houses, apartments or offices). A recognised interest may include 
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customary, statutory or informal social practices which enjoy legitimacy at a given time and 
place.  
Land tenure: the way land is held or owned by individuals and groups, or the set of 
relationships legally or customarily defined amongst people with respect to land. In other 
words, tenure reflects relationships between people and land directly, and between individuals 
and groups of people in their dealings in land.
20
  
These concepts all speak to the three important aspects of property in land and related natural 
resources: these dimensions concern not only relations between people and land but also 
relations between the individual and groups of people with respect of the land; it includes 
entitlements to access, use and control land and related natural resources; its legitimacy may 
come from social recognition and practices and depends on different contexts. It seems that 
the concept of tenure or property in land and related natural resources encompasses these 
important aspects. Therefore, in our following discussion, we use these two concepts 
interchangeably.   
The ‘continuum of land rights’ approach (Figure 1) was adopted at the 2011 UN-Habitat 
Governing Council resolution by Member States.
21
 This approach is seen as: 
the more sustainable way of providing security of tenure for all, at scale. The approach, 
described as a system where different sources of land access and use patterns co-exist, allows 
a diversity of tenure situations ranging from the most informal types of possession and use, to 
full ownership.
22
  
 
Figure 1: The ‘continuum of land rights’ approach23  
Yet,  ‘contrary to the name of the model, discrete tenure types are depicted in harmony with a 
staged understanding of tenure and incremental movement through the land rights and land 
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tenure types’.24  Indeed, this model has several limits. It uses statutory concepts such as 
registered freehold and adverse possession that may sound familiar to English or American 
property lawyers, but may sound foreign to people from other jurisdictions. It is still confined 
by binary thinking due to its adherence to the distinction between informal and formal land 
rights. It is based on a linear, teleological model that presupposes that informal land rights 
ought to be transformed into formal land rights, as indicated by the arrow which only moves 
in a single direction. Further, it overlooks the context.  
LEAP (the Legal Entity Assessment Project) has proposed another continuum of land rights 
model.
25
 It has revised the linear evolution of different types of tenure, as indicated in Figure 
2, so that the arrows move in both directions. However, it still highlights boundaries such as 
formal vs. informal; there is no specific emphasis on communal property; and it uses 
registration and written rental agreement as the measure of land tenure security.  
 
Figure 2: LEAP’s continuum of land rights26 
 
The Voluntary Guidelines 2012 and relevant FAO studies have improved the models 
proposed by UN-HABITAT and LEAP, emphasising the importance of context in perceiving 
the idea of land tenure. The Voluntary Guidelines seek to promote ‘secure tenure rights and 
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equitable access to land, fisheries and forests’ by setting out best practice.27 In preparing the 
draft of the Voluntary Guidelines 2012, many non-state actors were involved in the process 
of negotiation, including NGOs, farmer associations, development agencies, and the private 
sector.
28
 One outcome of the negotiation is that the ‘cultural, religious or emotional aspects of 
the land’ have been recognised.29 ‘States should recognize that policies and laws on tenure 
rights operate in the broader political, legal, social, cultural, religious, economic and 
environmental contexts’.30 More importantly, extralegal property including customary tenure 
has been recognised in FAO land tenure studies.
31
 Lands under customary tenure cannot be 
simply treated as ‘public or government land, vested in the nation or in the name of the 
president in trust for the citizens’.32  
While the protection of indigenous and customary tenure has gained momentum due partly to 
the development of international human rights law and soft law, protection afforded to 
extralegal property remains an understudied area. Our research shifts the Voluntary 
Guidelines’ focus on customary and indigenous tenure to extralegal tenure based on social 
relations between individuals and groups of people with respect to the land. This point will be 
elaborated in Figure 3 and the case study of minor rights property in China.  
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Extralegal  tenure: 
formation based on social 
relations with respect to 
land  
Customary tenure  
Indigenous tenure 
Legitimate 
tenure 
Extralegal tenure persists, albeit subject 
to coercion by external forces. 
Extralegal tenure is subsequently 
pronounced as illegal by law.  
Extralegal tenure is eventually recognised 
by law as formal property rights. 
Extralegal tenure is abandoned in social 
interactions. 
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Figure 3: Legitimacy of property and different ‘stories’ of the transformation of extralegal 
tenure 
Extralegal tenure may be interpreted very broadly and encompass customary and indigenous 
tenure, however the three types of tenure identified in Figure 3 are formed on a different basis. 
As discussed above, customary tenure may not be recognised by the state and is often 
regarded as extralegal; some groups such as fisherfolk, herders and pastoralists may not be 
characterised as ‘indigenous’, but may hold customary tenure. The legitimacy of customary 
tenure derives from custom. Indigenous peoples’ resource use is integral to their cultural 
identity. Although indigenous peoples may not have sufficient recourse to national law to 
protect indigenous tenure, protection of indigenous tenure has been gradually incorporated 
into an international human rights framework.
33
 Human rights have also become the major 
source of legitimacy of indigenous tenure.  
Our primary concern in this paper is extralegal tenure, whose legitimacy derives more from a 
de facto situation, based on social relations between individuals and groups of people with 
respect to the land. These social relations are shaped and reshaped by a variety of bonds such 
as shared economic interests and values, which encompass both spatial and temporal 
dimensions. For example, people share a sense of belonging by reference to locality, and they 
follow the same rules of the use of resources which may be intergenerational but not yet 
amount to customary. Compared to customary and indigenous tenure, this type of extralegal 
tenure receives the least protection from national law.  
The role of social relations in the formation of extralegal tenure indicates that social sanctions 
should be regarded as one source of the legitimacy of tenure: when people defend their land 
tenure, they are supported by the wider consensus of the community. Here we could draw 
links to relevant discussions on ‘the moral economy’ where some ‘legitimising notion of right’ 
is not to be found in either state law or ‘the free market’.34 Of course, we should recognise 
that property claims may have different degrees of legitimacy due largely to the different 
length of land use and degree of social consensus. These property claims may also be subject 
to various degrees of protection, as these claims ‘can be stronger or weaker according to 
social conventions, the law, enforcement conditions, and length of possession, political 
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support, etc.’35 As a result, there may be different stories (we use the word ‘stories’ to avoid 
indicating the linear evolution of property rights) of the transformation of extralegal tenure as 
elucidated in Figure 3. That said, the possible transformations of extralegal tenure should not 
be used to reject its nature as legitimate tenure.  
Property Law in China and ‘Primary Rights Property’  
Before looking at the nature of minor rights property, it may be helpful to start with some 
background introduction to Chinese property law. In the Mao era (1949-1978), the 
conception of ownership in China was overwhelmingly influenced by former Soviet 
jurisprudence. Ownership was regarded as indivisible and absolute. Public ownership 
(including state and collective ownership)
36
 was superior to individual interests; private 
ownership was virtually abandoned;
37
 acquisition and management of property was under an 
overarching administrative fiat.
38
  
 
Although civil law-making in the post-1978 era returned to the German Civil Law 
framework,
39
 a clear boundary between public ownership and private ownership still exists in 
the law, and a tri-ownership system including state ownership, collective ownership and 
private ownership has evolved and persisted. The right to property is defined broadly but also 
vaguely, in the General Principles of the Civil Law (GPCL, 1986), as ‘ownership and 
property rights relevant to ownership’.40 The concept is specified in the Property Law (2007) 
as wuquan, literally property rights over things (wu means things, particularly tangible things; 
quan means rights). The scope of property rights is limited by the Numerus Clausus principle: 
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wuquan includes ownership, usufructuary rights， and security rights. 41  While public 
ownership of land is still perceived to be ideologically important in China, the right to use the 
land by individuals and households has become one of the most fundamental, and, at the 
same time, controversial issues in Chinese property law. 
According to Article 4 of the Land Administration Law (1986, amended 1988, 1998, 2004), 
the state controls the purposes of the use of land. The state formulates overall plans for land 
utilisation, and classifies the purposes of land use into agriculture, construction use and 
unused. Article 4 (1) of the Land Administration Law provides:  
“Land for agricultural use” refers to land directly used for agricultural production, including 
cultivated land, woodland, grassland, land for farmland water conservancy and water surfaces 
for breeding; “land for construction use” refers to land on which buildings and structures are 
put up, including land for urban and rural housing and public facilities, land for industrial and 
mining use, land for building communications and water conservancy facilities, land for 
tourism and land for building military installations.  
 
Article 12 of the Interim Regulations Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right 
to the Use of the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas (1990, hereinafter ‘the Interim 
Regulations’) provides: 
The maximum term with respect to the assigned right to the use of the land shall be 
determined respectively in the light of the purposes listed below: 
    (1) 70 years for residential purposes; 
    (2) 50 years for industrial purposes; 
    (3) 50 years for the purposes of education, science, culture, public  
health and physical education; 
    (4) 40 years for commercial, tourist and recreational purposes; and 
    (5) 50 years for multiple uses or other purposes.
42
 
 
Since 1978 collective ownership of rural land has been fragmented into various forms of use 
rights according to the control of the purposes of the use of land, including the rights to farm 
land for agricultural use, that is, ‘contractual management rights’43 and use rights to land for 
construction purposes. Unlike use rights to urban land, there is no maximum term specified in 
law for using rural land for construction purposes. Land for construction use includes farmers’ 
residential plots reserved for farmers to build their houses, which constitute 70% of rural land 
for construction use.
44
 However, the extent to which the use rights to rural land may be 
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transferred and disposed of has raised a lot of debate. For example, Chapter 13 of the 
Property Law (2007) deals with LURs to rural residential plots, but fails to clarify the issue of 
the transfer and sale of these use rights (in instances where the plot has not been reclaimed by 
the state first). As a result, many informal norms concerning the transfer and sale of LURs 
have emerged at the grassroots level, giving rise to various sorts of property claims which are 
not necessarily recognised by law as property rights.  
The difference between the primary and minor rights property markets is closely linked with 
the rural-urban divide, which has become entrenched in the Chinese governance system in the 
post-1949 era. The Maoist regime, although it claimed to be pro-village and anti-city, ‘was 
fundamentally urban after all’. 45  Industrialisation was the priority in the making of the 
modern state, and the transfer of agricultural resources to subsidise the industrial sector 
enlarged the gap between the rural and urban areas. The mobility of rural people to cities was 
controlled by the state through the household registration system (huji zhidu)
46
 in which rural 
households were treated as ‘second-class citizens’ in terms of their entitlements to social 
security, education and health care provision. Further, the rural-urban divide has been closely 
linked to two different land systems—the rural land system and the urban land system: urban 
land is owned by the state and rural land is owned by the collectives; ownership of the land 
itself cannot be transferred. 
 
In the post-Mao era, and especially in the post-Deng period (1992-), large-scale rural-urban 
migration and rapid urban expansion have led to the relaxation of legal and administrative 
distinctions between urban and rural. For example, 17 provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities have abolished the category of rural household (nongye hukou).
47
 Yet the land 
system still remains as an obstacle to bridging the gap between the rural and urban areas.  
 
Before 1978, urban land was not a commodity, and was allocated by administrative methods. 
The state granted LURs to its agencies, for example, governments, state-owned enterprises, 
hospitals, and universities.
48
 These state agencies were not just land users, but also held 
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management rights and functioned as the de facto owners.
49
 Urbanisation has speeded up 
since the late 1980s, which fuelled the commercial value of urban land and increased the 
demand for urban land in the 1990s. This change called for a new mechanism to improve the 
marketability of the urban land system while maintaining the doctrine of state landownership. 
It was in response of this challenge that the LURs system emerged.  The establishment of the 
LURs system also served as an engine to boost economic growth.
50
 The LURs system, along 
with the change in housing provision through which urban households were given the 
opportunity to purchase their flats or houses for the first time, has led to the formation of the 
urban property market in China. 
The lease of state-owned lands has been legalised via the promulgation of the Land 
Administration Law (1986). In April 1988 the Constitution was also amended to provide that 
‘the right of land use can be transferred in accordance with the law’ (Clause 4 of Article 
10).
51
 However, rather than establishing a LURs system based on market principles, a ‘dual-
track’ LURs allocation system was introduced to assign LURs in urban areas. A dual-track 
allocation system means that LURs are assigned in two ways: allocation (huabo) and 
assignment (churang). Allocation is the transfer of LURs to state owned users without either 
time limits or land leasing fees; assignment is the transfer of LURs to non-state users via 
tender, auction or negotiation for a fixed period and for payment of land leasing fees.
52
 
Together allocations and assignments of LURs constitute the primary property market. The 
transfer of LURs via sale has, in effect, created a secondary property market.  
The Urban Real Estate Administration Law of the PRC was promulgated in 1994 (amended 
in 2007), for the purpose of administering urban land and real estate in China. It confirms the 
functioning of the dual track LURs allocation system and the existence of the dual property 
market. Article 3 of the Real Estate Administration Law stipulates that the state shall adopt a 
paid transfer of LURs system for the use of state-owned land for a limited period, except in 
instances where LURs are obtained through the state land allocation system in accordance 
with this law. Article 12 provides that the assignments of LURs could adopt tender, auction, 
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and negotiation.
 
However, in reality, assignment often lacks a transparent procedure.
53
 Under 
the dual allocation system, the property market is largely controlled by administrative power.  
 ‘Minor Rights Property’ and Legitimate Property Claims  
It may be helpful to clarify the scope of the minor rights property we are looking at in order 
to define and defend legitimate property claims. There are two categories of minor rights 
properties — those built on rural land where construction has been authorised by the state 
and those built on agricultural land.  According to the state control of land use discussed 
above, the state restricts conversion of land for agricultural purposes to land for construction 
in order to keep the total area of the land for construction under control and to provide 
special protection for agricultural land. For example, Article 63 of the Land Administration 
Law (2004) stipulates that no right to the use of land owned by rural collectives may be 
assigned, transferred or leased for non-agricultural construction. This is in line with China’s 
land policy and the pressing need to feed 1.3 billion people.
54
 Building minor rights 
properties on agricultural land changes the use of the land and is against the law.
55
  
In terms of minor rights properties built on rural land for construction purposes, there are 
also two kinds of properties. One is built by the village committees on the village communal 
land; the other is built by farmers on the residential plots.
56
 The former are mostly for 
commercial purposes rather than for farmers’ residential use. As discussed above, they 
contravene the law of land use control. Our focus is thus on those minor rights properties 
built by farmers on the residential plots — their purpose is not for large scale commercial 
sale; there are no issues with any violation against the control of the use of the rural land.   
Despite the popularity of the minor rights properties, the vagaries of such a de facto property 
market are due largely to the government’s critical scrutiny. For example, during the 17th  
National Land Day campaign on 25 June 2007, jointly sponsored by the Ministry of Land and 
Resources and the Beijing municipal government, one of the issues that apparently seized the 
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attention of buyers or potential buyers of minor rights properties was concern about the 
‘security’ of ownership rights: these properties cannot be registered, and buyers cannot use 
mortgages or bank loans to support their purchase. On 11 December 2007, the State Council 
declared that ‘city and township residents should not purchase “minor rights properties” in 
rural areas’.57 Following this declaration, a large number of minor rights properties in several 
areas were forcibly demolished.
58
  By contrast, township governments clearly acquiesced in 
the development of these properties, a fact which not only reflects an increasingly complex 
relationship between central and local government, but also strengthens the legitimacy of 
minor rights property if we follow an estoppel type argument. Township governments do not 
have the authority to assign LURs, and therefore they cannot profit from collecting the land 
leasing fees. As a result, township governments have managed to find an alternative source of 
income by encouraging the development of minor rights properties, thereby competing for 
income from land with the superior levels of government.
 59
  Moreover, there exist provincial 
variations in dealing with minor rights property. For example, in Beijing a lot of minor rights 
properties have been demolished on the orders of Beijing municipal government, whereas in 
Shanghai the Higher People’s Court has recognised the purchasers’ right to continue 
possessing and using minor rights properties.
60
 
Despite the central government suppression, the minor rights property market has become a 
vibrant realm where transactions frequently take place. The central government has tried, at 
least intermittently, to prevent the property market’s drift towards extralegality—but with 
little success: the minor rights property market continues to exist, and minor rights properties 
constitute a significant number of the residential properties (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: The vibrancy of the minor rights property market
61
 
The Origin of Extralegality and Diversity of Property Relations 
An examination of the nature of the minor rights property market warrants a brief review of 
its origins and historical development. Since land reform (1950-1953), residential plots had 
been recognised as farmers’ private property, and this was confirmed in the 1954 Constitution, 
but was subsequently abolished by Article 10 of the 1982 Constitution. Because of change, 
farmers only have use rights to the residential plots. The subsequent collectivisation (1966-
1976) introduced some fundamental changes to rural land ownership, primarily via the issue 
of a series of the Communist Party leaders’ speeches and policy documents rather than law. 
Indeed, there were actually no clear policies regarding how to acquire, utilise, transfer and 
dispose of property rights until the publication of the Revised Draft Principles on the Work of 
the People’s Communes (‘60 Principles on the People’s Communes’) in 1962. The Draft 
Principles are self-contradictory in that: they prohibit the lease and sale of the rural residential 
plots in Article 21; whereas in Article 45 they recognise that farmers have full ownership 
over the houses built on the residential plots and that they have the right to lease or sell these 
properties.
62
 These provisions have caused serious problems in terms of transferring farmers’ 
houses: when farmers have sold their houses, have the residential plots also been transferred? 
Farmers have recourse to consensus reached among themselves. In fact since 1962, the 
transfer of farmers’ houses between friends and relatives has become a common 
                                                          
61
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phenomenon.
63
 Farmers have tried to avoid talking about the transfer of land or land rights; 
rather, they have achieved a consensus that land rights have in fact been transferred as well. 
However, the nature of such sales remains vague: could the seller of the house ask for the 
residential plot back by arguing that the sale of residential plots is illegal and therefore the 
sale contract is void? This has actually become a major source of disputes in rural China, 
especially when the land value increases but the sale price is only based on the value of the 
house rather than the value of the land. Despite the existence of disputes, the minor rights 
property market continues to grow and the demand for minor rights properties is no longer 
limited to close friends and relatives within the rural area in the way that it used to be.  
The huge demand for rural houses since the economic reform commencing in 1978, the 
undercurrents of rapid urbanisation, as well as farmers’ strong motivation to benefit from 
such urbanisation have led to the extensive construction of minor rights properties, which 
began in the early 1990s. A particularly interesting phenomenon concerns the relationship 
between the construction of these sorts of properties and the formation of ‘villages within the 
city’, which are more than semi-undifferentiated urban/rural spaces. During the process of 
urbanisation, a large number of villages have been gradually enclosed in newly constructed 
urban areas.  These have become the ‘joints’ between the urban and rural areas, and 
eventually ‘villages within the city’ have formed in the expanding urban areas: residents of 
these villages live in the city — even the city centre — and enjoy city life as urban residents. 
However, the land of these ‘villages’ is still collectively owned by the villages themselves, 
the community is still governed by the village committees, and the residents are still members 
of the village. In other words, they still hold agricultural household registration, and in theory 
they are still the owners of the land where the village is located.
 64
 Farmers began to lease 
their houses to migrants who work in the city but choose to reside in these urban villages 
because of the affordable housing prices. As time goes along, the distinction between lease 
and purchase has become blurred, and many leases have transformed into de facto sales.  
Ironically, the early stage of the formation of minor rights properties was an active response 
to a series of governmental reforms, and it also gained the government’s support from the 
1980s to the 1990s. As discussed above, in the late 1980s, on the basis of the introduction of 
the LURs system, urban households in China were given the opportunity to purchase their 
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own flats or houses for the first time. The private housing market has since flourished. In 
order to obtain more land for construction, collaboration was formed between property 
developers and the rural collectives — property developers provided funding, and the rural 
collectives provided land. In some developed areas such as the Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
provinces, many rural households extended their houses; some urban residents also went to 
rural areas and built houses. Most of these houses were owner-occupied, but some were 
available for rental or for sale.
65
 The booming of minor rights properties has also been driven 
by the industrialisation that has taken place in the Pearl River Delta region since the early 
1980s. Foreign investment was introduced in this region, and a large number of enterprises 
and migrant workers moved in, creating a huge demand for space for factories and housing. 
As a result, many village committees built factories or residential houses on rural land for 
rental or for sale. In the meantime, many farmers individually or jointly built new houses on 
the residential plots or built extensions to their houses for the same purposes.  
Buyers of minor rights properties are attracted to their relatively low price, which only 
constitutes approximately 1/3 of that of commercial housing.
66
 According to a survey, 60.3% 
of people are willing to purchase minor rights property; 86% support the view that minor 
rights property should be legalised; 76.3% think that the legalisation of minor rights property 
will make the overall housing price cheaper.
67
  
Most purchasers envision property as their ‘home’ rather than ‘capital’. Although some of 
the purchasers of minor rights properties are investors who want to buy these properties for 
rental purposes, they are not the super-rich in the sense that they could not afford to invest in 
the formal property market. Most purchasers are pensioners, young professionals who have 
just started their careers, and rural migrants in the city who cannot afford the high price of 
commercial housing, and in the meantime want to own their houses.68 As a result, purchasing 
minor rights properties becomes a reasonable and legitimate choice. According to a survey 
conducted by Jin Zhifeng and others in Nanjing, 98% of households who have bought minor 
rights properties simply want an adequate standard of housing for living. 69  Moreover, the 
source of their funds comes from savings, and they are therefore able to avoid the risk of 
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being too reliant on bank loans, or of being in debt to loan sharks. Their property being 
extralegal actually gives them a strong degree of security. This echoes the argument made in 
relevant literature that ‘security of tenure does not require the issue of full legal title’.70  
The price of normal commercial housing is high, and this is in part due to the fact that when 
using state-owned urban land to construct housing, property developers need to pay land 
leasing fees to the government;
71
 and it is further due to the fact that commercial housing 
developers also want to make high profits. The fees and profits all increase the price of legal 
urban housing. Further, the building of commercial housing usually requires the acquisition 
of the collectively-owned land from the rural collectives, but farmers gain very little from 
land acquisition for property development.  After acquiring the land from the collectives, the 
government leases the land to commercial developers in return for their payment of high land 
leasing fees; farmers just receive compensation for the required LURs and cannot benefit 
from the value added to the land via development.
 72
  As a result, farmers are keen to build 
housing independently for the purposes of sale. The development of minor rights property 
has a huge impact on the profits accrued by the property developers on the commercial 
property market, and it also indirectly affects the government’s income drawn from land 
leasing. As a result, the central government has tilted toward the curtailment of minor rights 
properties.  
Extralegality, Law’s Limits, and Plural Rules  
The process of property lawmaking in China is one in which social reality pushes the law to 
reform, and this process struggles to strike a balance between party policy and law as well as 
between central and local law-making. Law-making in China is guided by a principle that 
asserts that broad legislation is always better than detailed legislation. Under this guideline, 
national law only provides general principles and needs to be complemented by various kinds 
of regulations for implementation. As a result, there exists a complex hierarchy of law-
making power and legislative organs (Figure 5). Specifically according to the Legislation 
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Law of the PRC (2000), the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee exercise 
state legislative power (Article 7); and only national laws may be enacted in respect of 
matters relating to ‘acquisition of non-state assets’ (Article 8 (6)). The State Council enacts 
administrative regulations in accordance with the Constitution and national law in order to 
implement the law (Article 56). Various ministries and commissions under the State Council 
also exercise regulatory power and make administrative rules in accordance with national law, 
administrative regulations, and decisions and orders of the State Council in order to 
implement administrative regulations (Article 71). The Local People’s Congress and 
Standing Committee make local decrees and local governments make local rules within their 
authorities (Articles 68, 71). In theory, the Constitution has the highest authority, followed by 
national laws and administrative regulations, which have higher authority than local decrees 
and administrative or local rules (Article 79).
73
 Local authorities tend to make law that suits 
local interests but not the national interest. Moreover, both the central government and local 
authorities tend to issue policies rather than laws and regulations in order to deal with matters 
relating to farmers’ property. As a result, competing and even conflicting rules have been 
generated, giving rise to an extralegal, grey area. However, these conflicting rules, a product 
of the wrestling for power between the central and local government, should not be used to 
refute the legitimacy of extralegal property.  
 
 
Figure 5: The hierarchy of law-making in China  
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The central government has in fact issued various policies concerning how best to deal with 
minor rights properties, which does indeed suggest some uncertainty within the higher-level 
authorities about the status of these properties. There are actually no laws prohibiting farmers 
from selling these properties. Article 62 of the Land Administration Law (2004) merely 
stipulates that individual rural households can only have one residential plot; if they have sold 
or leased their houses, their application for another residential plot should not be approved. 
Further, farmers’ sale of their houses is not against the Property Law (2007). 74  The 
subsequent ban on farmers’ sale of their own residential properties was issued in the form of 
a series of policy documents formulated by the central government.
75
  
Turning to the issue of whether urban residents can buy minor rights properties, no laws 
prohibit urban residents from doing so. Before 1998, it was legal for urban residents to build 
houses on the collectively-owned rural land as long as they obtained approval from the 
county government and fulfilled several requirements (Article 41 of the Land Administration 
Law (1986)).
76
 However, when the Land Administration Law was revised in 1998, this 
Article was deleted, and the city residents’ right to build houses in rural areas was thus 
abolished. That said, the law does not explicitly forbid urban residents from buying properties 
located in the rural area. Again, prohibition was issued via the publication of a series of 
policy documents.
77
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From the above analysis, we can see that only documents issued by the State Council prohibit 
these sales of the minor rights properties, but these policy documents do not constitute 
administrative regulations.
78
 Therefore, the announcement made by the State Council and 
relevant administrative departments declaring that minor rights properties are illegal does not 
have a solid legal foundation. It is better to characterise minor rights property as ‘extralegal’ 
rather than illegal.  
 
The evolution of property finds great proximity to extralegality in profound socio-economic 
transformations such as the economic reform commenced in 1978 in China, which is often 
characterised as ‘groping for stones to cross the river’,79 as well as the rapid urbanisation 
thereafter. This metaphor indicates both that economic reform is directed by the ongoing facts 
without clear guidelines or legal rules, and that the making of guidelines and legal rules often 
lags behind the pace of economic reform. Indeed China’s economic reform is not just a 
‘planned and top-down’ project directed by the central government. Beijing did not and is not 
able to conceive a unified and comprehensive plan that oversees every process and aspect of 
economic reform. The reality has been far more complex and intricate. 80  In fact, many 
initiatives that have propelled the reforms have emanated from the grassroots; some 
grassroots initiatives have eventually forced the law to bend to social pressures, in its creation 
and enforcement. Yet, in many cases, grassroots initiatives tend to run into obstacles when 
they seek legal recognition; these initiatives are bitterly suppressed, if they contravene the 
vested political and economic interest.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The case study of China’s experience helps contextualise global concerns regarding the 
definition of property and the extent to which the measure of the legitimacy of property has 
been recast. It also enables us to define extralegal property and to highlight the importance of 
recognising legitimate property claims. In China, farmers’ use rights to residential plots are 
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characterised as one form of usufructuary rights, that is, the right to use another person’s 
property. The law fails to clarify the extent to which these use rights may be transferred and 
disposed of, leading to controversies surrounding the sale of minor rights property.  As one 
form of extralegal property, minor rights property has been formed on the basis of long-term 
use of the land and via social interactions among farmers themselves, between farmers and 
urban residents and between farmers and local government. It has been supported by social 
consensus, and can promote a considerable degree of security of tenure. However, the 
enforcement of these legitimate property claims may be eroded or shattered by ‘bad law’ or 
political condemnation, and security of tenure may also be weakened. For example, threats to 
security of tenure come from demolitions and evictions ordered by the central government. 
And it is not because of extralegality that the central government condemns minor rights 
property. Rather, it is due to the fact that such property threatens potential vested interests, be 
they of a political or economic nature. The law cannot capture the diversity of property 
relations due to its inherent limits (for example, its incoherence and its inability to reflect 
complex and changing society); minor rights property has been pronounced illegal by 
government policies and documents, creating ‘legally propertyless masses’.  
The burgeoning of minor rights property in China clearly challenges the status quo system of 
law and exhibits a potential to change the law. If we recognise the legitimacy of minor rights 
property built on farmers’ residential plots, it means that use rights to farmers’ residential 
plots could be transferred and enjoy the equal status as use rights to urban land for 
construction purposes. It also means that farmers and urban residents will enjoy equal access 
to land. As these use rights are separated from collective ownership of rural land, the transfer 
of these rights will not affect the integrity of collective ownership of rural land; instead, it 
promotes more efficient use of the land. For example, we could follow the practice of 
transferring use rights to urban land and set up a fixed term for the use of the residential plots. 
The collectives, the owner of rural land, could charge the purchasers a land leasing fee. As 
such, the rural collectives, farmers, and rural residents with low income could all benefit from 
the development of rural land, while the collective ownership of rural land, in particular 
arable land, is still being protected.  
Minor rights property works in favour of legally propertyless masses, and there is a strong 
case for its retention. However, national law is unlikely to afford sufficient protection, as in 
national law the source of the legitimacy of property is strongly linked with the state. We 
need to turn our attention to the global level such as the Voluntary Guidelines 2012 where a 
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spectrum of property/tenure has been recognised (as further developed in Figure 3), including 
the access to, use of, and control over land and other natural resources by people who may 
hold nothing rather than user rights to land and natural resources.
81
 Of course, while soft law 
protection of property is often alleged to have limited legal effect due to its ‘non-binding’ 
nature and a lack of formal enforcement mechanisms, soft law may nevertheless provide a 
timely response to global concerns, fill in gaps where hard law protection is ineffective, 
recast the measure of the legitimacy of property, and become the starting point for 
negotiating international binding commitments.
82
 More work needs to be done to link the 
global with the local: facilitating the development of global guidelines via the study of local 
experience; and experimenting with mechanisms to internalise global guidelines in local 
contexts. 
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